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One Piece of the Puzzle: A Private Right to Your
Image in the Digital Age
ROBERTA. HEVERLY*
Abstract: This Article argues for the creation of a right in
one's image for those up to and including the age of twenty-
one. The right, which is justified by the pernicious
persistence of digital media over time and space, would
allow right holders to prohibit distribution of media
artifacts - audio, still image, and video files - that include
their image or voice. It is designed akin to moral rights in
copyright, and as such is not exploitable for profit as such,
but instead allows for those whose images are embedded in
digital media to halt distribution or display of those files.
Combined with other societal responses to the persistence of
digital media, including shifting social norms and
additional legal responses, the image right would form one
piece of the puzzle designed to mitigate the harshness of life
for young people in today's world.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a 2008 book chapter entitled Growing Up Digital: Control and
the Pieces of a Digital Life,1 I argued that the digitalization of media
content created by individuals (as opposed to media created by media
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conglomerates) created the potential for digital media to "haunt"
those featured in it for their lives in a way significantly different from
what was possible in the past. Noting that existing legal structures
relating to control over media artifacts-such as copyright or the right
of publicity-do not provide protection to most of those people who
would appear in digital media artifacts outside of the main stream
media, the chapter concluded that culture and law would have to
change to avoid the potential for long-term and unpredictable effects
on social relations. The chapter was focused primarily on children
who were captured by digital media, but the lessons were relevant to
adults-and especially young adults-as well.
In this essay, I extend elements of my original argument, and, in
so doing, propose a new right of a person in media artifacts that
contain the person's image or voice where that person was, at the time
the image was made, twenty-one years of age or younger (the "image
right"). I will not take on the whole of the implications of such a
proposal here. Rather, my purpose is to take a modest step: outlining
what such a right might look like, the terms it might include, and the
people to whom it might apply. I do not deal with the difficult and
complex questions of the constitutionality of such a proposal, nor
even with more basic questions such as the authority for its
enactment, primarily due to considerations of space. The small step I
take here is to identify what the right looks like, building on my past
essay that argues something should be done in this respect to mitigate
at least some of the harshness that flows from the magnifying glass
that the Internet puts on everyday life.
My proposal is not a silver bullet. It is part of a bigger puzzle, one
that involves education, a shift in cultural perception and reaction,
and additional legal changes designed to assist with finding solutions
to the problem outlined here.
I begin by briefly reviewing my previous work in this area, locating
it in the context of other work that was being done at that time and
that has been done since then, and emphasizing the problem of
persistence of media artifacts in the digital age. I turn next to defining
the "right in one's image," including identifying the situations in
which and persons to whom it would apply. After delineating the right
itself, I turn to some of the primary objections that are likely to arise
2 When the next step is taken and the constitutional implications are more fully explored,
the precise contours of the right as defined herein may need to be adjusted to comport with
constitutional requirements. That said, I proceed with the intention that what is here will
be defendable within constitutional discourse, and that it in fact will pass constitutional
muster.
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in response to its creation: that on a practical level it is unenforceable
given Internet distribution of content; that it gives too much control to
those captured in images and video; and that it would pose too many
problems for those who make their living from or who regularly
engage in making video, still image and audio media artifacts. I then
review how this piece of the puzzle would fit together with existing law
and proposals from other scholars. I conclude by arguing for inclusion
of the "image right" as a part of society's necessary response to the
persistence of digital media artifacts over time and space.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PERSISTENCE
When Growing Up Digital: Control and the Pieces of a Digital
Life was first published in 2008, little had been said about the changes
that digital media creation were bringing to the world given the
persistence of digital media.3 In my chapter, I argued that certain
changes brought about by the "digital revolution" created the potential
for long-term effects to be felt by those whose images were embedded
in digital media objects.4 Specifically, the ability to create, distribute,
store, and find media has changed, making media objects more
persistent than they were when media objects were primarily analog.
The difference between needing to find a photograph in an old
shoebox under the bed and being able to search for and find a video
on the Internet illustrates the point strongly. The latter is now more
and more possible, and the implications are potentially important in
the long-term.
I was concerned with the effects of digital media artifacts showing
young people in compromising, embarrassing, or inappropriate
situations, doing compromising, embarrassing, or inappropriate
things, and how these digital artifacts might later affect their lives,
their opportunities, and their relationships. What has brought us here
is the technological shift from the rather obscure existence of analog
media from our young lives-printed photographs with negatives,
VHS video camera footage, audio cassette recordings-to the
ubiquitous, easily searchable, connected, and potentially permanently
archived digital artifacts created today. I termed this permanence
"pernicious persistence," to reflect the notion that these digital media
But see, e.g., Peter Lunenfeld (ed), The digital dialectic: New essays on new media
(Cambridge, MA, MIT Press) (2000) (various essays portending the impending changes to
be wrought by the widespread adoption of digital media and digital networks).
4 Heverly, Growing up Digital.
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artifacts will have the potential to crop up again and again over time in
ways that we will not be able to control and may not be able to escape.
As examples, I used four case studies:
1. A young woman who allows her boyfriend to take sexy
photographs of her, and the photographs are later
distributed by the boyfriend following their breakup;
2. A young man who makes personal videos for his
girlfriend which, following their breakup, are
distributed on the Internet;
3. A teacher who is bullied and harassed by students who
have discovered a video of him that was made by
bullies when he was young, a video he knew was being
made when it was made, but which he was powerless to
stop; and,
4. A young woman who was bullied by classmates and
who was the subject of a hidden camera during the
bullying so that she did not know the video was being
made.'
The case studies show the variety of legal positions of control into
which the subject of a digital media artifact might be placed in relation
to video made of them. In the first scenario, as the "mere" subject of a
digital media artifact, the subject can assert little or no control over
the legal fate of that artifact. Absent commercial use, the law places
control over digital media artifacts in the authors of those artifacts,
not in their subjects. Actors and subjects are not included as authors
of those artifacts in these circumstances.
Next, while the young man in the second scenario is the "author"
of the digital artifact, or "work" in copyright parlance, a number of
exceptions under copyright law are likely to affect his ability to control
distribution (in addition to the problems inherent when such media is
distributed via the Internet). Scenarios three and four return us to a
5 At least one commenter on the original chapter theorized that these examples were purely
hypothetical, but two of them-scenarios one and two-were written based on real
situations, while scenarios three and four were predicted situations based on the potential
shown by digital media artifacts. HEVERLY, supra note 1, at
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situation in which the media artifact's subject has no control under
copyright law and, without commercial use, present unlikely cases for
violation of the publicity right. Each of these scenarios may raise
privacy concerns, but these are contextual and privacy is not coherent
enough to garner protection sufficient to overcome the problem here.
Together with the analysis that followed them, these scenarios
make two primary points. First, the shift to digital distribution of
digital media artifacts has the potential to significantly affect the way
in which we are viewed by and interact with the individuals in our
lives and in society as these artifacts resurface throughout our lives in
ways that analog media artifacts were unlikely to do. Second, existing
law gives the subjects embedded and displayed within digital media
artifacts little or no control over the digital media creations in which
they are embedded.
Additional case studies have appeared in the news since Growing
Up Digital was published. One example is that of "the drunken
pirate"- a young woman who distributed a picture of herself with a
drink in her hand and the caption, "drunken pirate." According to
news reports:
Stacy Snyder, 25, . . was a senior at Millersville
University in Millersville, Pa. . . . Last year, she was
dismissed from the student teaching program at a
nearby high school and denied her teaching credential
after the school staff came across her photograph on
her MySpace profile.'
Ms. Snyder subsequently sued the University, but lost.8 This
scenario adds a wrinkle to our discussion: how to handle people who
6 My initial analysis of the analog problem was short-sighted in that I argued that analog
media would not have this effect, but that instead it was limited to digital media artifacts.
This oversight was brought to light for me when a high-school friend posted a photograph
of me from high school on the social networking site "Facebook." The point? Analog media
artifacts, in the hands of individuals or perhaps a few individuals, their existence known by
few if any beyond this circle, difficult to distribute and nearly impossible to search, can be
made into digital media artifacts through digital technologies such as digital recording of
analog video or scanning of printed photographs. The proposal made here, and those made
by others, are thus relevant immediately even to those of us who grew up in an "analog
world."
7 Randall Stross, How to Lose Your Job on Your Own Time, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2oo7/12/3o/business/3odigi.html.
8 Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-166o, 20o8 WL 5093140, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3,
2008).
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have both embedded themselves in digital media artifacts and publicly
distributed those same files, especially where those people are over
the age of twenty-one years at the time they make themselves a part of
the media file in question.
How should society react to these scenarios? My conclusion in
Growing Up Digital was that a number of steps need to be taken in
response to the difficulties that young people are likely to encounter
when confronted with digital media artifacts in which they are
embedded. Initially, cultural attitudes toward images and videos of
young people engaged in the kinds of activities in which young people
engage need to evolve to accept the existence of these activities and of
the digital media evidence of them. Tolerance, understanding, and
compassion must increase in relation to any artifacts showing people
in embarrassing situations when they were younger.9
In addition, it is important that young people be educated not just
about the correct use of digital media, in terms of embedding
themselves within it and also in terms of embedding others, but they
must also be educated as to the long term consequences of their
choices in this regard.1 ° While this is a difficult concept to grasp,
especially for younger children, it is essential that youngsters be told-
again and again, over and over-that digital media does not easily go
away, and what might seem funny today might be life-changing in a
negative way tomorrow. These lessons should be taught at the
youngest ages that maturity levels and intelligence allow and should
be reinforced as children travel through school."
Finally, I briefly suggested that a right to one's image be used to
provide people with the ability to control the distribution of digital
media that contain their image or voice made when they were minors.
I argued, "[a]dopting either a German style 'control over image
publication' right for minors.., or even a copyright-style distribution
right in favor of children who are the subjects of digital media
artifacts, is one possible step." 2
9 HEVERLY, supra note 1, at 215.
10 This is not a new argument. Fred Cate made it as well in his 1997 book, Privacy in the
Information Age, noting that users may need education to become aware of the operation
and effects of using computer related technologies: "One must learn about the often
invisible actions of software and hardware by reading instruction manuals and help
screens, finding resources ... in print or on the Internet, and perusing the fine print...
FRED CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 103 (Brookings Institution 1997).
11 HEVERLY, supra note 1, at 214.
121d.
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While I was writing and publishing Growing Up Digital, Viktor
Mayer-Sch6nberger was preparing his book, Delete: The Virtue of
Forgetting in the Digital Age.' Identifying similar concerns as
Growing Up Digital, Mayer-Sh6nberger-emphasizing the "drunken
pirate" scenario noted above-argues for the importance of "social
forgetting" and laments its potential loss through technological
methods. ' Since then, other legal scholars have added their voice to
the growing chorus, suggesting potential legal changes that might help
recapture the forgetfulness that was prevalent in the analog age. 5
Directly on point with the concerns raised in Growing Up Digital,
Jonathan Zittrain's The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It,
argues for a policy called "reputation bankruptcy," in which people are
able to "wipe clean" their electronic history in certain categories. 6 The
idea is to give people a "second chance" in relation to some of their
electronic history. A similar solution that amplifies this notion was
suggested by Google CEO Eric Schmidt in the Wall Street Journal,
where he "predicts, apparently seriously, that every young person one
day will be entitled automatically to change his or her name on
13 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETrING IN THE DIGITAL AGE
(Princeton Univ. Press 2009).
14 Id.
15 Another proposal is tangentially related here. It responds to the near absolute protection
given to Internet Service Providers that has immunized them when users post defamatory
material (such that defamatory material might remain online even if a court finds it is
defamatory). See 47 U.S.C. § 230. Cass Sunstein suggests in his book On Rumors: How
Falsehoods Spread, Why We Believe Them, What Can be Done, that this strong protection
be tempered somewhat so that individuals would be given a "right of retraction" entitling
them to have such content removed from the Internet. This would not aid those who have
materials posted about them that are true, nor would it help in the case of those unable to
win a defamation lawsuit due to their public figure status, but would fix what many see as a
bug rather than a feature of current law. It strikes as well at the problem of pernicious
persistence, the idea that what ends up on the Internet has the potential to stay on the
Internet, where it contributes to unnecessary and perhaps unfair trouble for those it
portrays. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ON RUMORS: How FALSEHOODS SPREAD, WHY WE BELIEVE
THEMNI, WHAT CAN BE DONE 78 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2009).
16 JONATHAN ZITTRA[N, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP
IT 228-29 (Yale Univ. Press 2008); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End
of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2o1/o7/25/magazine/
25privacy-t2.html, describing the "Vanish" technology.
2012]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
reaching adulthood in order to disown youthful hijinks stored on their
friends' social media sites."'7
In a similar vein, technological and marketplace solutions have
been developed to overcome the same kinds of problems as those
presented by the pernicious persistence of digital media artifacts.
Firms such as Reputation.com, Reputation Hawk, and Visible me all
offer services to help people try to remove or "play down" those
negative media elements through the use of online strategies such as
building a strong online persona or optimizing search engine results
to push negative results down below more positive results. 8
Technological forays are also being made into what is seen as the void
of eternal permanence of digital media artifacts-the pernicious
persistence I referred to in Growing Up Digital.'9 One attempt is to
give digital artifacts an end or expiration date, such that they would
degrade over time and eventually be unrecoverable. 0 Finally, at least
one author has provided a method of disappearing from the grid
altogether in a book entitled How to Disappear: Erase Your Digital
Footprint, Leave False Trails, and Vanish without a Trace." All of
these efforts, including scholarly proposals and technologies, popular
how-to guides, marketplace solutions and popular press reports and
accounts,22 focus, to some degree, on providing a second chance, that
is, removing portions of an online life from the prying eyes of anyone
who would wish to see it.
Everything in this realm is not about erasing history. Jeffrey
Rosen recently gathered a variety of the proposals together and
discussed them in the New York Times.23 As noted by Professor
17Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Google and the Search for the Future, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487o49o11o4575423294o995272 12.html.
18 See, e.g., Reputation.corn, http://www.reputationdefender.com (last visited Apr. 27,
2011); Reputation Hawk, http://www.reputationhawk.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2011);
Visible.me http://visible.me/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2011).
19 Heverly, Growing up Digital, at 200-201.
20 See Roxana Geambasu et al., Vanish: Increasing Data Privacy with Self-Destructing
Data (2009), http://vanish.cs.washington.edu/pubs/usenixseco9-geambasu.pdf
21 FRANK M. AHEARN & EILEEN C. HORAN, HOW TO DISAPPEAR: ERASE YOUR DIGITAL
FOOTPRINT, LEAVE FALSE TRAILS, AND VANISH WITHOUT ATRACE (Lyons Press 2010).
22 See Rosen, supra note 13.
23 See id.
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Rosen, some proposals would not erase, but would instead seek to
mitigate the effects of what others would see about a person online.24
Rosen notes that Paul Ohm has suggested that employers be
forbidden from making hiring and firing decisions based on online
content. 25 This would work to preclude "Googling" as a step in the pre-
employment screening process, as well as preventing it from playing a
significant role in the continued employment process. Where
decisions are made based not on job performance, but rather on
activities, images, or opinions stated online that do not relate to the
job, the employer would be forbidden from acting on them to preclude
or release the employee in question. This approach would allow
societal and cultural effects such as being shunned by friends or
tormented by co-workers, but would hope to avoid the hardest hitting
of the potential effects of the permanence of digital media: financial
implications.26
In addition to legal strategies, almost all of the authors who have
approached the problem of pernicious persistence-myself included-
have noted that a shift in how individuals, societies, employers, and
governments respond to portrayals of mistakes, errors, and poor
judgment is required given the problems of pernicious persistence,
however that persistence is defined in the various scholarly pieces that
address it.
27
These proposals are not mutually exclusive. The law could provide
for reputational bankruptcy while still precluding employers from
using non-work-related media found on the Internet in hiring and
firing decisions. Integrating the notion of a cultural shift in
perception, especially as it relates to youthful indiscretions, is also
part of the solution. Together, we can conceive of a toolbox of options
from which to choose in an effort to mitigate and respond to the
pernicious persistence of digital media.
The various proposals and possibilities each make up one tool in
the toolbox of potential responses to the problems posed by pernicious
persistence. It is as part of this toolbox of potential solutions that the
notion of a private right in one's image is proposed. The right would
not supplant any of the above suggestions, nor would it override the
24 id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 13 and Zittrain, supra note 15.
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nearly uniform perception of scholars that culture and society must
adjust to the changes that the creation of digital artifacts has wrought,
in continuing to bring to our memories, and to our understandings, of
who we are. Rather, it is simply one piece of the puzzle.
Before we proceed, one final factual scenario will help us
understand the implications of control in the digital age and
emphasize the discrepancy between those with control over media
artifacts and those without. It involves the artist Larry Rivers, who,
over a period of many years, filmed the ongoing "development" of his
daughters as they matured. This resulted in raw footage and an
explicit film, including close-ups of the girls' genitals and breasts and
probing and intrusive questions asked by Rivers.28
One daughter, who said she was pressured to
participate, beginning when she was 11, is demanding
that the material be removed from the archive and
returned to her and her sister.
"I kind of think that a lot of people would be very
uptight, or at least a little bit concerned, wondering
whether they have in their archives child pornography,"
said the daughter, Emma Tamburlini, now 43.
Ms. Tamburlini said the filming contributed to her
becoming anorexic at 16. "It wrecked a lot of my life
actually," she said.29
This is the quintessential case of being embedded in a media
artifact and having no control over the course of its distribution.3 ° It is
complicated by the involvement of a father. While NYU, the university
that holds the archive including the films, has pledged to keep them
private so long as the daughters are alive, it is under no legal
28 Kate Taylor, Artist's Daughter Wants Videos Back, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2olo/o7/o8/arts/design/o8rivers.html.
29 Id.
30 Id. At this point, the films are held as part of an archive sold by the Larry Rivers
Foundation to New York University. The university has pledged to keep the videos "off
limits" while the daughters are still alive, and is in discussions regarding the fate of the
films beyond that time.
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obligation to do so.3' The daughters-who do not own the copyright to
the works and do not hold the physical copies in their control-have
no clear legal right to demand that the films not be shown. While
Rivers's films were analog, the concerns they raise are made more
acute, not less, by the pervasive persistence of digital media in the
32Internet age.
1II. ONE PIECE OF THE PUZZLE: A RIGHT IN ONE'S IMAGE
The solution to the problem of the pernicious persistence of digital
media is a complex one. There is no silver bullet answer, but even so,
something must be done to assist and acknowledge those who are
affected by the pernicious persistence of digital media artifacts. That
such artifacts can be easily made and distributed, and then later-
perhaps much, much later-be located, identified, and redistributed
must be addressed by society. Legal aspects of society's response are
not only important, they are an essential element of the answer to this
problem. The effect this situation has already had is notable, and it is
likely to increase in the future given continually decreasing costs of
media creation and the increasing effectiveness and sophistication of
storage, searching, and distribution.
Mayer-Sch6nberger, Zittrain, and Ohm, among others, have all
made proposals relevant to society's response to the difficulties raised
by the persistence of digital media, arguing for some form of digital
forgetting.33 Technology is being created with a similar goal.34 It is
only with a variety of potential responses, all with independent
support in law and culture,that the victims of the pernicious
persistence of digital media artifacts can overcome the changes
brought about by cheap creation and distribution of digital media
files.
I turn now to defining the image right itself. German law provides
a useful backdrop against which to consider the problem of
persistence. Specifically, the German concept of the right of
personality includes a right allowing a person pictured in an image to
object to its dissemination or public exhibition, as follows:
:31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See, Mayer-Sch6nberger, supra note 13; Zittrain, supra note 16; Rosen, supra note 17.
34 See, note 20, supra, and accompanying.
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§ 22 KUG.
Pictures or portraits may be distributed or displayed
only with the consent of the person portrayed, i.e., the
subject. In cases of doubt, consent is considered to have
been given if the person portrayed has received a
consideration for allowing himself to be portrayed.
When the subject dies, and for up to lo years
thereafter, the consent of the next of kin is required.
Next of kin within the meaning of this law are the
surviving spouse and children of the subject and, if
neither the spouse nor the children are alive, the
parents of the subject.
§ 23 KUG.
(1) The following may be distributed or publicly
displayed without the required consent
according to § 22:
a. Pictures within the realm of contemporary
history;
b. Pictures in which the persons appear only
incidentally in a landscape or other location;
c. Pictures of meetings, receptions, processions
and other gatherings in which the persons
portrayed have participated;
d. Pictures that have not been produced by order
or request, but whose distribution or display
would be in the higher interests of art.
(2) Consent does not however extend to
distribution and display in which the legitimate
[Vol. 7:2
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interests of the subject or the next of kin are
infringed.35
The German image right is provided to everyone and does not vary
with age.36 It presumes consent to the creation and distribution of the
image (and the embedding of the person within it) in cases where one
was paid to be included in the image, but note that this would not
necessarily include the right to use the image for those purposes to
which the person so pictured did not consent.37 In addition to the
notion of the right itself and its requirement of consent, the statute
creates a series of exceptions to the prohibition on non-consensual
distribution, and then tempers those exceptions where their
application would injure another interest of the person pictured (or, if
deceased, the person's relatives).38
Returning to the image right being proposed here, the German
law's provisions serve as a model, though they will be modified to
better achieve the goal outlined above. For our purposes, the
definition of the "Image Right" is proposed here as follows, though for
completeness, the entire law as proposed is reproduced here, with
each section being discussed below:39
§ 1. Pictures, portraits, videos, films, audio recordings,
or other media objects in which a person's likeness or
voice can be perceived either visually or aurally may be
played, displayed, distributed, broadcast,
35 Susanne Bergman, Publicity Rights in the United States and in Germany: A
Comparative Analysis, 19 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 479, 501, note 207 (1999). See Harry Krause,
The Right to Privacy in Germany-Pointers for American Legislation? 1965 DuKE L.J.
481, 486, note 19 (1965), (including provisions of an earlier German statute, translation by
Krause).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 § 23 KUG. (2).
39 The provisions outlined in the proposed law are drafted as a first attempt to meet both
practical and legal requirements relating to the right being granted to the subjects of media
artifact creation. They have not been largely vetted and are subject to further amendment
as the project progresses into the next stage. While this essay cannot hope to address the
constitutional implications of the proposal in the space allowed for, the implications still
guide aspects of the proposal's form and content, and this section provides an escape valve
that may assist in overcoming free expression objections to the right itself.
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communicated, or performed only with the consent of
the person (the subject) whose likeness or voice is
contained within it where that person, at the time the
media object was created, was twenty-one years of age
or younger.
§ 2. For purposes of § 1:
a. Consent is presumed where the subject was
paid to be included in the media object and a parent or
guardian who was not a participant in the creation of
the media object and who did not benefit directly by its
creation consented to creation of the media object;
b. Consent may be implied by the facts and
circumstances surrounding the creation and
distribution of the media file where the subject at the
time of distribution is over the age of twenty-one years,
but such implied consent may be revoked by the rights
holder at any time. Circumstances implying consent
may include that the subject knew of the media
artifact's creation at the time of creation or thereafter,
knew that his or her image or voice was included
therein, knew that the file was being or was to be
distributed, and did not object to its distribution.
§ 3. Exceptions: The following media objects may be
distributed without the subject's consent pursuant to §
1:
a. Media objects portraying current news and
events;
b. Media objects portraying the participants in
historical context;
c. Media objects in which the subject's inclusion is
incidental;
d. Media objects portraying participation or
performances in sporting activities;
[Vol. 7:2
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e. Media objects currently being publicly
distributed by the subject him or her-self or pursuant
to his or her consent;
f. Media objects distributed as part of an
educational disciplinary process or as part of a criminal
or regulatory investigation so far as needed for that
process or investigation;
g. Media objects portraying the subject's voluntary
participation in role-playing in organized theater, film,
television, concert, or musical productions; and
h. Media objects portraying the subject's voluntary
participation in official educational functions, such as
graduations and assemblies.
Section 1 expands on the German definition at the same time that
it confines it. By including not just images but also all types of
multimedia files, it captures the artifacts that are of concern to us here
and provides for the subject's right to object to their distribution. It
also limits that protection to images, voice recordings, or renderings
in which the subject was twenty-one years of age or younger,
excluding adults from its protections, and where the person cannot be
recognized in the media artifact. 0 This latter portion is based on the
overriding reasons justifying the creation of the right: young people
should be able to experiment, grow, learn, and gain experience
without recordings or images of those natural processes coming back
to "haunt" them at a later date as they grow into adulthood.4'
The law often recognizes a distinction between adults and
children, imposing differing levels of punishment on them for
crimes.42 While the provision here is more clear cut-criminal law and
40 It does this through the use of the word "likeness," which, within this context, would
include situations where there is a likelihood that if viewed by people familiar with the
subject, the subject would be recognized as being the person portrayed or recorded within
the media object.
41 See HEVERLY, supra note 1, at 209-11.
42 See, e.g., John Burrow, Punishing Serious Juvenile Offenders: A Case Study of
Michigan's Prosecutorial Waiver Statute, 9 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol'y 1, 8
(2005)(discussing the manner in which juveniles can be removed from the juvenile justice
system and placed in the adult justice system).
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tort law, as examples, often vary their application as a child grows
older-the perception is that some of the gravest dangers lie in wait for
young adults who are first exposed to the taste of adulthood, those
who are seen as being most likely to be captured in digital media
artifacts, 43 and thus potentially have the most to lose.
In section 2, the German notion that consent should at times be
presumed is also carried across.
Paragraph "a" of section 2 would act to "save" the creation of
professional and commercial media content that is intended, at its
making, for distribution, that is, commercial or independent films,
photography, and audio works. Absent such a provision, the film
industry would be thrown into uncertainty as to a child star's future
wishes about film distribution every time a child was included in a
film. In addition, it allows commercial media operations of all kinds to
act with certainty so long as they obtain consent of the parent or
guardian to the distribution of the file at the time it is created and the
child is paid for participation in its creation.
Paragraph "b" acknowledges that many people will not object to
the distribution of their image or voice, and, as such, provides for
implied consent where the circumstances warrant it.
The inclusion of exceptions is necessary in the context of the
problem that is raised by the persistence of digital media artifacts. To
that extent, the German law again provides a basis upon which to
build, and the elements in section 3 provide us the necessary leeway to
implement the image right without unnecessarily stepping on other
legal rights and privileges.
News and events exclusions and historical context exclusions are
necessary to prevent one individual from controlling public discourse,
especially in a society where popular culture is often dominated by the
cult of the personality. Where young people throw themselves into the
spotlight, this provision will not assist them in maintaining a false
image of themselves for public consumption. The "incidental
inclusion" language is provided so that people "in the background" of
images, videos, and sound recordings cannot exploit their incidental
inclusion to extort payments from media producers and creators
without sufficient cause. Media objects may provide evidence of
disciplinary violations or crimes. As such, it would be inappropriate to
forbid their distribution in such proceedings or investigations. Doing
43 See, e.g., Amanda Lenhart et al, Social Media & Mobile Internet Use Among Teens and
Young Adults, Pew Internet & American Life Project (February 3, 2010);
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/20lo/Social-Media-and-Young-Adults.aspx
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so would potentially undermine important processes and make the
administration of schools and of the justice system unnecessarily
difficult, and allow the subject to create false realities that are
potentially unfair or unjust.44
Related, but distinct, is the exception for media objects that show
students or other young people in organized role-playing activities,
such as when they sing in a chorus, play in a school orchestra or band,
or act in a school or community play. Though on a smaller scale, the
concerns here are similar to those in the commercial media market:
that one person who participated in such an activity will later use their
youth to try to prevent everyone who participated in the activity from
being able to enjoy the fruit of their labors. Where, as here, there are
other protections in place to prevent serious damage from flowing out
of such activities-and the school system or community activities
structures are likely to provide just such protections-the subject has
no right to rely later on a provision intended to protect his or her
image from inappropriate use or exploitation with an intent to harm.
Participation in sports activities and events would also fall under
this section. In such circumstances, the video of a track and field race
need not be edited to remove a particular subject who has lost the
race. Rather, losing is part of childhood and the image of that loss is
not something from which a subject needs protection either when it is
recorded or later in life.4' The same is true for voluntary participation
in graduations and educational assemblies, where the image right
would be inapposite.
An exclusion for media objects that are being distributed by or
with the consent of the subject is also proposed and further
distinguishes this right from other potentially similar rights, such as
copyright. 46 These provisions are about control over your image in
14 That is, the person who is the subject of a disciplinary proceeding may be able to
"pretend" that they did not take a particular action simply because the image right would
otherwise, without this exception, allow them to preclude use of the relevant image during
the disciplinary proceeding.
45 But note that if, during a play, a young man was "pantsed" (had his jeans pulled down by
another actor) without warning, in a way that was not part of the play, the distribution of a
video recording including that portion of the play, that is, the unplanned and inappropriate
embarrassment of the subject, could be enjoined, as the subject's participation in that
aspect of the play would not have been voluntary as required by the exception.
41, Copyright Law allows copyright holders to license both people and the uses to which
those people can put a particular media object. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §106 ("the owner of
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following [acts]." (emphasis added)
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distributed media files, not about controlling how or when those files
are distributed if the subject allows distribution. If distribution is
allowed by one, then all distribution by any person is allowed so long
as consent is continued for that one. There is no way under the statute
to allow for distribution by one but not others. While such
commercialization may be possible under copyright law, where the
subject is not also the copyright holder, the image right will not step in
and provide this additional level of economic control.
Throughout the proposal there is no provision for control over the
use of the media object beyond the subject's ability to consent to its
distribution (viewing the term "distribution" widely to include the
various forms included in section 1). This analogizes the right not to
an economic right-one that would provide sufficient control in the
subject to commercialize and benefit monetarily from the work itself-
but rather to a moral right,47 one that allows a person to control how
their "media youth" affects them as adults. It is thus an "on or off'
proposition: the adult either consents to distribution of media
artifacts in which they are embedded as youthful subjects, or they do
not. Relief provided would therefore appropriately be injunctive:
ending distribution of the file. Damages would not be appropriate
absent, perhaps, repeated and willful violations of the right by the
defendant, and then the damages would be primarily punitive, not
compensatory. Overall, the proposed law would provide those who
have themselves been embedded as subjects in digital media the legal
right to object to and stop distribution of most but not all of the media
artifacts in which they are included.
Before moving on, an aside on two points is necessary. First, the
law would prohibit only the distribution of visual or auditory media
objects, not textual media objects.48 If a young person (under the age
of twenty-one) was the subject in a video recorded at a Ku Klux Klan
rally, the young person could, if desired, prohibit distribution of the
portions of that video that include their image. The subject could not,
however, block textual descriptions of what was seen in the video or
what occurred at the rally. For someone who has a public presence,
such as a well-known actor or a politician, the dilemma would be
47 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, Paris
Act of Jul. 24, 1971, amended Sep. 28, 1979. See also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, "Author-
Stories:" Narrative's Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright's Joint Authorship
Doctrine, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2001); ELIZABETH ADENEY, THE MORAL RIGHTS OF AUTHORS
AND PERFORMERS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1-2 (Oxford Univ. Press
2006).
48 See, note 42, supra, and accompanying text.
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clear. If they blocked distribution of the video itself and then claimed
that it didn't exist, the putative distributor could ask them publicly for
permission to distribute the video. If they decline, it will be seen as an
admission that the video exists. If they say publicly that they would
allow it but continue to use the legal process to block distribution, a
court might imply consent from their public actions (as contrasted
with their private interactions with the distributor). As such, speech
itself is not stifled, but is instead shifted from image to text, a point
that will become more important when the constitutional analysis of
the provisions of the right is more fully explored in a future article.
Second, the proposal as outlined at this point might be adopted by
either the federal government or a state.49 There are provisions in the
laws of each that might serve as appropriate precedents for adoption
of such a right. That said, as with the constitutional implications, the
shortened length of this essay precludes both the discussion of the
contours of the right and the basis for its adoption. This issue, along
with the free expression aspects of the right, will need to await future
review.
If we consider the proposal in relation to our case scenarios, we
note that it would reach five of the six case studies outlined above.
Only the "drunken pirate," who posted her own photo on her MySpace
page would be excluded from protection given the confines of the right
and the exceptions created. Initially, Ms. Snyder posted the image that
caused her problems herself. No other person needed to redistribute
or otherwise pass on the image to cause her problems. Assuming that
some additional distribution took place as part of the disciplinary
process at her university, it would be shielded by the exception
contained in section 3(e). The exception in section 3(e) would apply
only so long as Ms. Snyder continued to distribute the file herself on
MySpace (or elsewhere).
Aside from the drunken pirate, the remainder of our scenarios
would easily fit within the protection provided by the right, allowing
subjects who are haunted by media objects to argue for a legal right to
have their persecution or victimization halted. Tellingly, the right
would quite easily reach the dilemma raised by Larry Rivers's creation
of a film documenting his daughters' growth. The daughters are
49 Consider, for example, state rights of publicity, see, e.g., N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 50, or
federal prohibitions against the making and distribution of "bootleg" recordings of live
concerts, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A. While both avenues have their pitfalls-for example, the right
of publicity ordinarily focuses on the use of an image in commercial speech and the federal
anti-bootlegging statute is a criminal law-they are at least considering in much greater
detail in future scholarship.
20121
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
clearly captured within the film itself, which would prohibit
distribution unless either consent can be implied under section 2 or an
exception under section 3 applies.
In the Rivers scenario, the consent provisions in section 2(a)
would not rescue the NYU archive from the right's scope as the
daughters were not paid to participate in their father's "project"
(section 2(b) would also not apply here as the daughters have already
objected). Under section 2(a), consent would not be implied beyond
its explicit terms to allow an implication of consent, as such an
implication-along the lines of "they appeared in the film and
participated in its creation"-might seem plausible. It is exactly this
kind of argument-that the subject knew the media object was being
made-that the law is designed to protect against. That is to say, the
inability of the young person to properly consent, to assert themselves
against the appearance of consent that comes from active
participation, is a main part of the basis of the law itself. Protecting
against a young person's inability to fully comprehend the potential
long-term effects of their decisions is the critical element in
precluding their continued victimization from their use in media
objects. Allowing a generalized theory of consent to form the basis for
a defense to assertions of the right would undermine its primary
purpose, and so the definition of consent limits its application by
providing a much narrower exclusion for consent aimed at
commercial uses of child actors and performers. Thus, Rivers's
daughters would be able to argue for application of the right without
the danger that their apparent complicity-and note that this
complicity is apparent only-somehow immunizes the film against
their rights under the proposed law.
In addition, none of the exceptions would apply in this case. While
section 3(f) may appear a likely candidate, it should be read to apply
only to media objects created of other performances themselves, such
as plays or television skits, that is, media objects created of the young
person's other entertainment activities, not an object created focusing
on the subject him or her-self. That is, the daughters were not playing
a role, they were being embedded in the media as themselves. This
again is the primary kind of "use" of a person in media artifacts that is
intended to be reached by the right.
IV. NON-LEGAL OBJECTIONS
As noted above, there are likely to be substantial objections raised
to any proposal such as the one presented here. Some will be primarily
legal. That is, that the proposal would violate the protection of
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freedom of expression under the federal or state constitutions, or that
it is preempted by the federal law of copyright, which provides at least
one similar right and arguably limits Congress's power to enact
provisions intended to encourage the production of creative goods
(rather than protecting some notion of subjects' control over media
objects in which their images are embedded). Such concerns are too
substantial for an essay of this length, and therefore these legal
questions are postponed for the time being to future work (currently
in progress).
This reality does not mean, however, that I must put off discussion
of all objections, as there are likely to be practical, technological, and
social objections to the proposal as well. The primary objections along
these lines are: that the existence of a right such as this would be
ineffective given the distribution power of the Internet and the ability
of distributors to remove the means of distribution from the
jurisdiction of the relevant law (and that it would in fact reinforce the
negative effects of distribution by focusing attention on the very media
object the subject hopes to control); that it gives too much control to
subjects of media artifacts who happen to be young when they are
made (especially in contrast to adults who fall outside of the twenty-
one year age limit); and, that it will create severe problems, large-scale
inefficiencies, and uncertainty in the creation of media objects in a
way that runs counter to the needs and desires of society.
The first objection is probably the strongest: that is, that without a
method of perfect enforcement, the nature of the Internet as a
decentralized method of distribution will lead to the media object in
question receiving greater distribution in response to assertion of the
right rather than less, as the object is replicated on multiple servers in
varying jurisdictions. Some of these servers may not be subject to the
jurisdiction of courts in areas where the right can be asserted. That is,
asserting the right may have the opposite effect of that sought. Within
Internet circles, the unintentional escalation of publicity for a work
that someone wishes to downplay is known as the "Streisand Effect. 5 °O
According to a New York Times article:
5o The dilemma is making its way into the legal literature as well. As one student notes,
many Internet involved entities are "aware of what has come to be known as the Streisand
Effect. The idea of the Streisand Effect is that the filing of lawsuits in an attempt to protect
privacy often has the opposite effect of that which was intended. Instead of making the
problem go away, the lawsuit draws unwanted attention to the issue, making it more
popular and bringing it further into the public consciousness than it otherwise would have
been." Doug Meier, Note, Changing with the Times: How the Government Must Adapt to
Prevent the Publication of its Secrets, 28 Rev. Litig. 203, 217 (2008) (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
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[T]he Streisand Effect [is] a phenomenon on the
Internet where an attempt to censor or remove a piece
of information backfires, causing the information to be
widely publicized. It owes its name to Barbara
Streisand's unsuccessful legal efforts to suppress the
publication of photos of her Malibu house; this
campaign only brought more Internet publicity to her
private life. Recent victims of the Streisand Effect
include the Church of Scientology (trying to suppress a
video of Tom Cruise speaking about the church), the
Swiss bank Julius Baer (trying to suppress documents
alleging the bank's complicity in asset hiding and
money laundering), and the Russian oligarch Alisher
Usmanov (trying to suppress criticism and juicy
biographical details of his early life that appeared on
British blogs). 1
Add to the general notion of the Streisand Effect the various
jurisdictions into which media objects might flee and the efficacy of
any right given to subjects embedded in media artifacts seems more
hopeless still.
There are a number of points to make in response. First,
regardless of the efficacy of any particular piece of legislation,
legislation itself makes a statement as to a society's or culture's
accepted practices. In other words, it is worth saying even if it is not
strictly controllable and enforceable in every case. It emboldens the
rights holder and puts the unlawful distributor on the defensive,
forcing them to "run and hide" as it were. It delegitimizes the practice
of trading on people's visual or auditory misery and will force large
scale commercial operations to abandon any pretense of marketing or
commercializing content of this type.
This latter point plays into another part of the response: while it
will not always be enforceable or even wise to seek enforcement, there
are times that it will be enforceable and when defendants will be
within the confines of the relevant jurisdiction and subject to its
orders. There will be times when content developers and providers
will need to respond to the concerns of those who appear as subjects
in the media objects in which they traffic. Some content providers and
media object traffickers will choose to respond, most likely out of
51 Evgeny Morozov, Living with the Streisand Effect, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/12/26/opinion/26ihtedmorozov.1.18937733.html.
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concern for the reaction of their customers and society at large if they
do not, while others will respond only in the face of litigation and
potential legal sanctions. In any event, while the right will not be
perfectly enforceable, it will also not be perfectly unenforceable. When
combined with the statement that the creation of such a right makes
on a social and cultural level, the benefits of the right outweigh the
potential negative effects that a lack of perfect enforceability will bring
to these concerns.
The second objection is that such a right gives too much control to
individuals over the dissemination of works in which they appear. Yet,
authors of works under the Copyright Act have substantially more
rights over works they create than subjects would be given here. It is
possibly no more than an accident of history that the rights granted to
those who appear in media artifacts are given little or no control over
those artifacts, while those who the law views as "authors" receive all
the economic and moral desserts. In addition, as noted below, there
are times that individuals who did not author a work under the
Copyright Act52 are given the opportunity to decline to allow others to
work with the part that they have put into a media object. This arises
both in terms of the right of publicity53 as well as the right to stop
unauthorized recording and distribution of live concerts (even where
the underlying work being performed is not copyright protected).5 4
The right here is narrow: simply the right to stop distribution. No
further rights along the lines of copyright are granted or anticipated,
and no further extensions are required to achieve the goal here of
empowering individuals who appear in media artifacts to be able to
exercise some control over the artifacts in which their under-twenty-
one-year-old selves appear. Thus, while the image right might
preclude use of an image by one who wishes to use it, it will not in
practice create a greater or stronger right than those that already exist
in relation to the use and distribution of media artifacts.
The final objection can also be met. Considering the exceptions
that are built in to the process, professional and even amateur media
creators will be able to adapt to make certain that their works fall
within one of the agreed exceptions. Where they do not, they will run
52 17 U.S.C. § l1 etseq.
53 i Paula B. Mays, Protection of a Persona, Image and Likeness: The Emergence of the
Right of Publicity, 89 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 819, 820 (2007).
54 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A. Unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and
music videos of live musical performances.
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the risk that a young person featured within them will object to their
inclusion on an ongoing basis. That will be the price of participating in
the relevant markets, and is a feature, not a bug, of this design. That
is, where an exception does not clearly apply, market players will be
hesitant to expend resources developing media objects that may, in
the end, not be legally distributable. Working within acceptable
models and implementing appropriate business practices will allow
"above board" media entities and creators to continue to create. Those
who wish to "fly below the radar" run the risk that the plug will be
pulled on their efforts by someone under the age of twenty-one who
appears in their media objects.
IV. ONE PIECE OF THE PUZZLE
Given the above, a brief look at how the right "fits" into existing
law and other proposals for addressing the problem is the final step
we need to take. The task as related to existing law was previously-
although equally briefly-undertaken in the Growing Up Digital
chapter, and so will not be belabored here.
Copyright law can and will continue to be useful in relation to
media artifacts that feature the author as a subject. In such a case, the
image right would supplement copyright law, giving the author and
subject additional control over when and how the work is utilized and
distributed. The image right would not trump copyright provisions,
and there would be no need for copyright provisions to trump the
image right. They would work in tandem in such situations, allowing
for a fuller vindication of the rights of the subject and author.
The right of publicity, on the other hand, is at the same time a
smaller and a larger version of the image right. It is more limited in
that it applies only to commercial exploitation of an image, but it is
broader in that it applies to more than just persons who are twenty-
one years old or younger. Thus, it is another piece of the puzzle that
fits well with the image right. Where one was under twenty-one years
of age when the media artifact was created, the image right will
probably be the stronger right, as it does not require a commercial use
to come into play. Where the subject was older than twenty-one years
of age at creation, the right of publicity will step in to prevent
commercial use of the person's image in appropriate circumstances.
The alternative proposals for dealing with the concerns raised
separately by Professors Mayer-Sch6nberger, Ohm, and Zittrain also
fit well beside the image right as tools to be able to manage the issues
that arise due to the pernicious persistence of digital media across
space and time. The image right directly aids Professor Mayer-
1Vol. 7:2
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Schdnberger's calls for a renewed cultural discussion on our reaction
to the things that we can dig up in cyber-space. An image right would
set the standard as saying, "these things, in relation to young people,
are not for public consumption. They are aspects of growing up, part
of normal life, and we will not dwell on them." Professor Zittrain's
"reputational bankruptcy" is also a complementary tool to the image
right, though much stronger in terms of its outcomes. Used in extreme
cases, it would provide a much needed backstop for those who need a
wholesale approach to overcoming youthful indiscretions stored,
indexed, and distributed over the Internet.
Not all of the proposals need to be made part of the toolbox,
however. The even more extreme example of reputational bankruptcy
suggested by Google CEO Eric Schmidt-an automatic, complete
breaking of personality, name, and personhood at the age of twenty-
one to overcome "youthful indiscretions"-seems unlikely for two
reasons (though obviously would obviate the need for an image right
tailored to that same age grouping). The first objection to Schmidt's
idea is that it would be too easy to reconnect someone's new persona
to their old, making the entire process futile. The second is that many
(most?) people would probably be unwilling to sever themselves from
family, friends, and hard-earned positive reputation they have gained
through the first twenty-one years of their lives, even when their
record also contains difficult or embarrassing elements. An
"automatic" renaming would vitiate any effort to retain the good,
leaving little or no way of carrying positive achievements forward
without jeopardizing the entire process.
Contrast Schmidt's position with that of Professor Ohm: Professor
Ohm's suggestion that employers be prohibited from essentially
spying on prospective or existing employees again complements the
image right quite well. Where the image right would apply, it still
would not preclude an employer from making decisions based on
media objects that were publicly distributed prior to the subject taking
action to have them removed. Where a person is worried about the
effects media objects from their youth may have on their adult job
prospects, they can use the image right to remove media artifacts
containing potentially damaging images from public distribution.
Where they are older, or the media objects are covered by one of the
exceptions, they would still be able to prevent an employer from
relying on private actions of employees when making job related
decisions.
Thus, the image right fits well in the toolbox alongside existing
and proposed responses to the persistence of media artifacts. Together
with the notion that culture and society must become more
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compassionate and understanding, these tools can help aid those who
would otherwise be haunted by literal visions of their past.
V. A NEED FOR ACTION, A NEED FOR REVIEW
Regardless of agreement or disagreement with this particular
proposal, one thing is certain: action must be taken to deal with the
effects that the permanence and search-ability of digital media files
will have on individuals as they are growing up. How we do that is a
necessary mixture of legal and cultural norms. The image right is one
piece of a puzzle that would allow those people whose youthful
activities have been caught "on tape" to overcome the stigma that
might flow from those media objects following them throughout their
lives. By offering the protection of a legally enforceable right, society
both makes a statement and offers a tool to media subjects to begin to
control their own destinies. Without it, we risk continuing to subject
those who were simply growing up to recurring and perhaps endless
reliving of difficult periods in their lives or periods that are no longer
representative of who they are today. Returning to the Larry Rivers
saga puts this conclusion in perspective: "[Larry Rivers's daughter]
Ms. Tamburlini... said she has spent several years in therapy trying
to deal with the effect of her father's behavior. "I don't want it out
there in the world," she said. "It just makes it worse."55 She should be
able to make sure these videos that feature her at a critical juncture of
her life are not "out there," rather than begging someone else to "do
the right thing" by her. 6 This proposal would play a part in allowing
her to do that.
55 Taylor, supra note 21.
56 Id.
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